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National Parliaments: Obstacles or Aid to the
Impact of International Human Rights Bodies?
jasper krommendijk
This chapter argues that parliaments are an important actor facilitating the realisation
of human rights. It shows that some recommendations of UN human rights treaty
bodies (COs) have been eﬀective and resulted in change as a result of the eﬀorts of
Members of Parliament (MPs) in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland.
Nonetheless, parliaments can also pose an obstacle to the implementation of interna-
tional human rights and COs. A wide parliamentary consensus on a certain practice is
sometimes used as a simple excuse (by the government) for not acting upon the
recommendations put forward in the COs. At the same time, MPs can be self-
righteous and critical about the quality of UN human rights treaty bodies and hence
argue against the implementation of COs. The last part of this chapter presents
a tentative list of domestic variables conditioning the (diﬀerence) in the engagement
of parliaments with COs.
10.1 Introduction
How can parliaments inﬂuence the impact of international (human
rights) law? Is their contribution always in favour of implementation of
international norms or can they also work against and be an obstacle to
the realisation of human rights? Policy documents seem to suggest that
the greater the involvement of parliaments in international human rights
law processes, the more beneﬁcial this is from a human rights perspec-
tive. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the
recent Council of Europe Brussels Declaration have, for example, called
upon States to better involve parliaments in the process of implementing
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (JCHR
2010, paras. 15–17; Pourgourides 2010, 39; Rieter 2012; Brussels
Declaration 2015). Likewise, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights and UN human rights treaty bodies have recommended that
parliaments monitor the implementation of recommendations of treaty
bodies (CEDAW2010, para. 8; Pillay 2012, 85). On the other hand, recent
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‘incidents’ actually suggest that this strategy is not always useful, as the
(initial) resistance in the British Parliament to the now famous judgment
of the ECtHR on prisoner voting in Hirst illustrates (Hunt, Hooper &
Yowell 2012, 9–10; Bates 2014). Slow or contested compliance with
human rights judgments can thus occur when MPs and other actors
aim to protect the democratic decision-making process and the position
of Parliament as the guardian of the rule of law, also because they are
afraid of negative headlines in the British newspapers (‘the Daily Mail
eﬀect’; Cali & Wyss 2009, 12, 15).
These opposing observations suggest that there is still a lot of uncer-
tainty about the role of parliaments in relation to international human
rights law. The two questions presented earlier have indeed received little
academic attention and are, for example, not addressed in Conant’s excel-
lent chapter where it is noted that national courts are the most important
actors enforcing international rights (Conant, this volume). To date, the
role of parliaments in relation to international human rights law has hardly
been researched in a systematic way, except for some studies on the ECtHR
(Donald & Leach 2015, 2016; Multirights 2015; Squatrito 2015). This has
been even truer for the UN human rights treaty bodies, which generally
suﬀer from scholarly neglect. The most widely accepted method for treaty
bodies to monitor the implementation of UN human rights treaties,
besides the optional individual complaint procedure, is the process of
reporting. This reporting process stems from the obligation of State parties
to submit periodically, usually every four or ﬁve years, a report on the
implementation of each UN human rights treaty they have ratiﬁed.
A committee or treaty body consisting of independent experts examines
this report. Civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can
also submit so-called shadow or parallel reports to the treaty body, which
usually contain a more critical view and recommendations. The most
important element of the human rights assessment by the treaty body is
the discussion (‘constructive dialogue’) between the treaty body and the
representatives of the State party in Geneva or New York. The treaty body
subsequently adopts legally non-binding recommendations, concluding
observations (COs).
This chapter aims to answer the following research questions: what has
been the impact of the COs of the treaty bodies on parliaments? In what
way have parliaments contributed to the eﬀectiveness of COs? Which
domestic variables, primarily those relating to the (institutional) organi-
sation and functioning of parliament, condition this impact and eﬀec-
tiveness or lack thereof? For the purpose of this chapter, the six oldest
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treaty bodies have been examined (Table 10.1). In addition, three estab-
lished democracies (the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland) were
selected because they are considered most-likely cases in the sense that
they are generally seen as obedient compliers with international law and
human rights in particular (see Section 10.2.2).
It should be stressed from the outset that treaty bodies are not inter-
national courts (ICs) in the classical sense and their output is legally non-
binding. That does, however, not make them irrelevant to study when
dealing with ICs and domestic politics, because similar phenomena are at
stake. The examination of treaty bodies is especially appropriate for three
reasons. First, COs are more than merely advisory. They are increasingly
seen as authoritative statements or interpretations that cannot easily be
ignored by States (Steiner 2000, 52; Dimitrijevic 2001, 198; O’Flaherty
2006). The International Law Association (ILA), for example, observed
that treaty body pronouncements are ‘more thanmere recommendations
that can be readily disregarded’ (ILA 2004, para. 15). There are also some
judgments of national courts that give support to a stronger status of COs
Table 10.1 Overview of the six main UN human rights treaties
and treaty bodies
UN human rights treaty Treaty monitoring body
Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD) [adopted in 1965]
Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD)
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) [1966]
Human Rights Committee (HRC)
International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
[1966]
Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR)
Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) [1979]
Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW Committee)
Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
[1984]
Committee against Torture (CAT
Committee)
Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) [1989]
Committee on the Rights of the Child
(CRC Committee)
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because the COs were accorded persuasive or moral authority (ILA 2004,
paras. 32–33). Treaty bodies can and should, thus, be taken seriously as
some type of judicial body.
Second, another reason for examining treaty bodies is that these bodies
could be more accessible for individuals and NGOs than their more
juridical counterparts such as the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) or the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Treaty
bodies can at times oﬀer more opportunities for individuals to have their
complaints and grievances heard in relation to issues that such bodies
and other ICs cannot handle because they fall outside the scope of the
treaty or they have locus standi requirements that are diﬃcult to fulﬁl.
NGOs may be more likely to gain support from treaty bodies especially
for issues that pertain to economic, social and cultural rights. This is also
because treaty bodies are known for their sometimes activist approach
and willingness to adopt a progressive interpretation of the treaties,
which might be questionable from a strictly legal point of view, but
strategically advantageous for NGOs and individuals (Acar 2007, 342;
Krommendijk 2014, 196–7, 251).
Third, another argument for doing research on treaty bodies is that
there are already many studies on the impact of regional courts, such as
the ECtHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
(Anagostou 2010; Hawkins & Jacoby 2010; Hillebrecht 2014).
By contrast, treaty bodies and the process of State reporting have so far
been almost completely neglected even though they constitute one of the
most important international mechanisms to monitor the implementa-
tion of UN human rights treaties (Connors 2000, 4; Kälin 2012, 16).
The little research conducted so far has shown that treaty bodies have had
some impact, albeit rather limited (Byrnes 2000; Heyns & Viljoen 2001;
Zwingel 2005; Krommendijk 2014).
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways: ﬁrst, by
oﬀering an empirical overview as to the impact of the COs on parliament
and the role of parliament in contributing to the eﬀectiveness of
COs. Second, and maybe even more importantly, in identifying factors
that (tentatively) inﬂuence the impact of COs and the way in which
parliaments contribute to the COs’ eﬀectiveness, this chapter aims to
contribute to theory building in the context of international relations (IR)
and international law (IL) by adopting an exploratory or inductive
approach. These independent variables might subsequently serve as
a basis for the formulation of hypotheses that can be tested empirically
in future research for their generalisibility in a more structured fashion.
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This chapter is based on PhD research that primarily examined the
(domestic) impact and eﬀectiveness of the treaty bodies in three coun-
tries (Krommendijk 2014). For the purpose of that research, 175 inter-
views were held with diﬀerent domestic actors, including Ministers of
Parliament (MPs), and a wide range of documents were studied, includ-
ing parliamentary minutes and papers. In the context of this research,
parliaments were approached as just one of the many relevant domestic
actors in the ‘domestic political ﬁeld’ (Wind Introduction this volume).
This chapter will focus exclusively on parliaments and will attempt to
isolate their role and contribution in relation to the eﬀectiveness of COs.
The chapter is structured in the following way. The ﬁrst section
presents the research design, which includes a theoretical overview,
a justiﬁcation of the country selection and the methodology used to
assess the impact and eﬀectiveness of COs. The second section discusses
the empirical results and shows how parliament can contribute to or
obstruct the eﬀectiveness of COs. The fourth section oﬀers some expla-
natory factors for the parliaments’ engagement with COs.
10.2 Research Design
Before presenting the theory review and the methodology, a couple of
words should be devoted to semantics. Many terms are used to describe
the eﬀects of international law and courts at the national level, amongst
others, ‘impact’, ‘implementation’, ‘compliance’, ‘inﬂuence’ and ‘eﬀec-
tiveness’. The dependent variables in this chapter will be the impact and
eﬀectiveness. The term ‘impact’ is used to refer to the way in which
parliaments have used or referred to the COs. ‘Eﬀectiveness’ is used to
describe the extent to which these COs have led to policy, legislation or
any othermeasures.What distinguishes eﬀectiveness from themost often
used concept of ‘compliance’ is that the former implies a change whereas
the latter merely requires a conformity between the COs and the policies
and laws that are in place (Raustiala 2000, 388; Martin 2013;
Krommendijk 2015). This chapter will also refer to the notion of ‘engage-
ment’ with COs to capture the two phenomena of impact and eﬀective-
ness more generally.
10.2.1 Theory Review
In the legal human rights and IL literature, the focus has traditionally
been on the interaction between ICs, monitoring bodies and domestic
national parliaments 231
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108590396.012
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteitsbibliotheek Nijmegen, on 12 Jul 2019 at 12:37:07, subject to the Cambridge
courts (ILA 2004; Keller & Stone Sweet 2008) or the impact of interna-
tional norms on the executive in terms of policy and legislative change
(Cohn 1991; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Heyns & Viljoen 2001; Niemi
2003; McQuigg 2007; Hawkins & Jacoby 2010). Recognition is, however,
increasing in the IR and the political science literature that other domes-
tic actors and mobilisation matter for the impact and eﬀectiveness of
international law (Simmons 2009; Dai 2013; Hillebrecht 2014). The idea
is that the eﬀectiveness of international bodies depends upon the mobi-
lisation of domestic advocacy groups, NGOs, MPs and the media in their
ability and willingness to pressure governments to change their beha-
viour (Neumayer 2005, 930; Simmons 2009; Wind Introduction this
volume). Hafner-Burton concluded that international norms must
‘creep into domestic aﬀairs [and] be taken up by local advocates’ to be
eﬀective (Hafner-Burton 2013, 11). International institutions must thus
‘co-opt’ domestic actors ‘from within’ (Moravscik 1995). If they do, then
they can act as ‘tipping point actors’ by strengthening the leverage and
legitimacy of domestic actors and can give these compliance constitu-
encies a powerful tool or additional argument (Alter 2011; see also
Simmons 2009). Domestic compliance constituencies can thus be viable
‘decentralised enforcers’ who use international institutions as a focal
point to legitimise their demands (Dai 2013; see in relation to courts,
Conant this volume). A particular eﬀective strategy for domestic actors is
to voice their grievances at the international level with the idea of secur-
ing a critical recommendation or judgment that supports their views,
which they than ‘bring back home’ to strengthen and amplify their
demands so that the terms of the debate can shift. This what is commonly
referred to as the ‘boomerang eﬀect’ (Keck & Sikkink 1999; Risse, Ropp &
Sikkink 1999). The central argument of these theories focusing on
domestic and transnational mobilisation is, thus, that domestic change
in relation to human rights is dependent on the presence and strength of
domestic actors.
These and other studies on domestic and transnational mobilisation
have not paid much structural and in-depth attention to the role of
parliaments in relation to international (human rights) courts and mon-
itoring bodies.1 Simmons, for example, focused on the executive, the
judiciary, and citizens and NGOs as the three compliance mechanisms by
1 There is, however, considerable work as to the role of parliament in relation to domestic
bills of rights (see Tushnet 1999; Waldron 2005; Hiebert 2006; Geddis 2011; Hunt, Hooper
& Yowell 2012; Hiebert & Kelly 2015).
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which international human rights treaties inﬂuence change in rights
policies and practices (Simmons 2009, 126–39). Some studies, however,
recognise that parliament is one of the relevant domestic actors contri-
buting to the implementation of judgments of international human
rights courts (Baluarte & De Vos 2010, 51, 55, 60; Hillebrecht 2012,
293). Anagnostou and Mugiu-Pippidi, for example, found that countries
with the best record of implementation of ECtHR judgments, the UK and
Austria, had the most extensive parliamentary involvement in the imple-
mentation process, while the countries with the worst record, Greece and
Romania, had minimal involvement (Anagnostou & Mugiu-Pippidi
2014). There is, however, not much attention paid to the way in which
parliament really contributes to the implementation of international
human rights law, albeit some recent studies have focus exclusively on
parliament in relation to human rights treaties and judgments (Donald &
Leach 2015, 2016; Lupu 2015; Squatrito 2015).
Focusing on parliament is even more relevant in the case of the treaty
bodies and their legally non-binding recommendations. Despite an
increasing recognition that COs are authoritative interpretations by
some domestic courts, COs have hardly been used in litigation because
of the preference among litigants and courts for ‘hard law’ and judgments
of the ECtHR (ILA 2004, paras. 175–9; Krommendijk 2014, 371). COs
have thus primarily been used by NGOs in the political process of
‘naming and shaming’ the government with the idea of pressuring and
mobilising parliament to request the government to change or take up
the matter itself. Parliaments as such are thus better than courts when it
comes to ensuring that COs are eﬀective. As mentioned in the
Introduction, this chapter has an inductive focus and aims to identify
independent variables that aﬀect the impact of COs and the way in which
parliament contributes to the COs’ eﬀectiveness. Table 10.2 presents the
variables, which will be thoroughly discussed in Section 10.5.
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10.2.2 Country Selection
TheNetherlands, NewZealand and Finlandwere selected because theywere
considered most likely cases, countries from which you would expect the
COs to be taken seriously. This choice was inspired by the existing literature
on treaty bodies, which spoke about ‘chronic’ or ‘distressing’ levels of non-
compliance and an ‘implementation crisis of dangerous proportions’
(Schmidt, Bayefsky & Rodley 1997, 463). Even the Oﬃce of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Secretariat held
in 2006 that ‘governments frequently pay insuﬃcient attention to the
recommendations adopted by the treaty bodies, and lack of awareness or
knowledge among national constituencies about themonitoring procedures
and their recommendations renders these invisible at the national level’
(OHCHR 2006, para. 25). These statements are not surprising in the light of
the many deﬁciencies in the functioning of the treaty bodies, which are well
documented (Alston & Crawford 2000; Keller & Ulfstein 2012). If the
system is to have any result, this would be in advanced and established
liberal democracies, which generally take their reporting duties seriously
and also have the resources to fulﬁl this burdensome task (LeBlanc,
Table 10.2 Overview of independent variables aﬀecting the impact of COs
on parliament and parliament’s role in relation to the eﬀectiveness of COs
Structural or institutional factors
Proportional representation vs. ﬁrst past the vote voting system
Bicameral vs. unicameral parliamentary system
Separate constitutional or human rights committee vs. a mainstreamed human
rights approach across parliamentary committees
Monist vs. dualist nature of the legal system (e.g. status of international human
rights treaties and possibilities for judicial review)
Membership of a strong regional human rights system (e.g. ECHR/ IACHR)
COs or treaty body dependent factors
The level of other domestic actors informing and lobbying parliament about
the COs
Salience and media coverage of the policy issue covered in the COs
MPs’ direct engagement with the treaty bodies and the reporting process (e.g.
submission of parallel report or attendance dialogue in Geneva)
The level of government informing parliament about the COs
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Huibregste & Meister 2010; Conant this volume; Wind Introduction this
volume). Established liberal democracies committed to the rule of law
generally tend to have a better domestic human rights culture and more
‘domestic constituencies’ in the form of an active civil society, an indepen-
dent judiciary, a strong parliament and a free press (Helfer & Slaughter
1997, 329–30; Heyns & Viljoen 2001; Hafner-Burton 2013).
Three relatively similar countries within the group of Western liberal
democracies were chosen to limit the number of diﬀering variables
(Krommendijk 2014, 2015). The three countries are similar in not being
federal States, which makes the implementation of international human
rights law easier because there are generally fewer levels of government and
veto players than in federal States (Heyns & Viljoen 2001, 508). In addition,
they do not have a Constitutional Court that would hamper reception of
international human rights law as well since (strong) Constitutional Courts
such as the German Bundesverfassungsgericht tend to base their judgments
on domestic bills of rights (Helfer & Slaughter 1997, 332–333; Keller & Stone
Sweet 2008, 686; Conant this volume). Besides the Netherlands, Finland was
chosen out of the Nordic countries that generally integrate international
reporting rather well in domestic policy processes (Connors 2000, 10).
Finland, in particular, is seen as a consistent and dutiful complier with
international (human rights) norms (Sverdrup 2004). Another practical
reason for selecting Finland was the availability of academic literature in
English about human rights and the impact of COs (Heyns & Viljoen 2001;
Niemi 2003; ILA 2004). New Zealand was selected from a list of non-
European Western democracies that also included Australia, Canada and
the United States, because it is not a member of a regional (human rights)
system, nor is it a federal State with a Constitutional Court.2
There are some similarities and diﬀerences between the three countries as
to the institutional setup of the parliamentary and legal system, which relate
to the independent variables presented in Table 10.2. The three countries are
similar in the sense that they have a proportional voting system that has
contributed to a multi-party system with many political parties represented
in parliament. In the Netherlands and Finland, coalition governments have
traditionally been the practice. New Zealand has also had coalition govern-
ments since 1996 as a result of the introduction of proportional voting in the
same year. The three countries diﬀer, however, in terms of the organisation
2 It was deliberately decided to include a country that is not a member of a regional ((human
rights) system (such as the ECHR or EU) to examine whether UN human rights treaties
and the COs of treaty bodies have more impact in a country that only has these mechan-
isms with which to comply (see Krommendijk 2014).
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and operation of their parliamentary systems. First of all, the Dutch
Parliament (States-Generaal) is bicameral and consists of the House of
Representatives (Second Chamber) with 150 seats and the Senate (First
Chamber) with 75 seats. Both New Zealand and Finland have
a unicameral Parliament with respectively 120 and 200 seats. Second, the
Netherlands and New Zealand do not have a speciﬁcally designated parlia-
mentary committee that is tasked to deal with human rights. In Finland, the
Constitutional LawCommittee has a constitutional duty to ‘issue statements
on the conditionality of legislative proposals [. . .] as well as on their relation
to international human rights treaties’ (Sect. 74; Tuori 2012, 14–15). Third,
both the Netherlands and Finland are monist with respect to their reception
of international law, while New Zealand is dualist and requires treaties to be
incorporated in national law before they can be given (direct) eﬀect by
national courts. Fourth, in Finland and New Zealand there is a strong belief
in the sovereignty or supremacy of their Parliaments with only a very limited
role of courts in terms of protecting human rights (Ojanen 2012, 106).
Especially in New Zealand there is an idea ‘that parliament can do anything’
(Hopkins 2011, 429; Waldron 2005).
10.2.3 Methodology
A couple of words should also be devoted to the methodology used to assess
the eﬀectiveness of COs (Krommendijk 2014, 49–68, 2015). First, the level of
eﬀectiveness of COs was established, primarily on the basis of an analysis of
the documents in which governments gave a reaction to the COs (periodic
State reports and governmental letters to parliament) and the data gathered
through the 175 semi-structured interviews with domestic human rights
stakeholders in all three countries (government oﬃcials, NGO representa-
tives, representatives from national human rights institutions, ministers and
MPs). Several indicators were used to establish a relation between follow-up
measures and COs (Krommendijk 2015). Second, based on IR and IL
theories that posit that the eﬀectiveness of international institutions depends
upon their authority in the eyes of those who have to implement their
output, government ministers and oﬃcials were asked about their views as
to the authority of the treaty bodies (Franck 1990; Gibson & Caldeira 1995;
Hurd 1999). Third, various database searches of governmental and parlia-
mentary papers, court judgments, NGO websites and newspaper articles
were conducted to examine whether domestic actors, including MPs, used
the COs in their work. It was, for example, examined whether MPs submit
(written) parliamentary questions, motions or legislative proposals as
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a result or on the basis of the COs. For the Netherlands and New Zealand,
a (database) search of parliamentary minutes and papers was conducted.3
For Finland, Petri Helander, Counsel to the CLC, undertook a search of
documents of the Constitutional Law Committee (CLC).4 This quantitative
and qualitative assessment of the impact of COs on parliament was com-
plemented with the views from interviewees, including MPs, as well as
academic literature about the level of mobilisation of parliament.
10.3 Empirical Results
10.3.1 Impact of COs: The Extent to Which Parliaments Have
Used or Referred to the COs
The COs of the six treaty bodies have had some impact on parliaments in
the three countries. MPs have often used the COs incidentally and in
a reactive and opportunistic way as an additional argument or as support
for their position with a reference to an ‘authoritative’ committee. MPs
have particularly referred to COs when they were already active on
a certain issue and when the COs were in the media. This also means
that there has not been any structural interest in the parliaments in terms
of monitoring the implementation of COs in a comprehensive way. MPs
have primarily asked the government for a reaction to newspaper head-
lines, without reading the actual report or COs and without knowing
anything about the reporting process. In addition, the level of engagement
of parliament with respect to the COs has depended very much upon
individual MPs (for a similar conclusion as regards the JCHR in the UK,
see Hunt, Hooper & Yowell 2012, 24). This is also because the awareness
and knowledge of MPs of the reporting process and the COs are fairly
limited. One example is a Dutch MP, Bussemaker (Labour), who alone
raised eleven written parliamentary questions in which the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination againstWomen (CEDAW)was referred
to in a period of three years, with one reference to the COs of the CEDAW
Committee (TK 2001/02b; Krommendijk 2014, 170). Note that there has
been no direct or proactive interaction between parliaments and the treaty
3 Two Dutch databases were used for the period 1 September 1995 until 31 August 2011:
parlando.sdu.nl (currently out of operation) and zoek.oﬃcielebekendmakingen.nl. For
New Zealand this was Hansard for the period 1 January 2000 and 14 June 2012. Diﬀerent
search terms were used. For a full overview, see Krommendijk 2014, 417–25.
4 Helader used the word ‘komitea’ (committee) for the period between 1 January 2004 and
13 May 2013.
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bodies, except the one instance in which the New Zealand Maori Party
submitted an alternative report to the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) (Maori Party 2007).
The Dutch Parliament has been most engaged with international
reporting processes. Dutch MPs have been fairly active in using or
referring to the COs of the CRC Committee and – to a lesser extent –
the CEDAW Committee. By contrast, the New Zealand Parliament has
hardly been active in relation to the process and the follow-up to the COs,
except for the COs of CERD pertaining to the controversial issues of the
position of the indigenous Maori population. The Finnish Parliament
takes a position somewhere in the middle.
10.3.2 Eﬀectiveness: The Extent to Which COs Led to Policy,
Legislative or Any Other Measures
Since the mid-1990s, 74 legislative, policy and other measures have been
taken in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland as a result of the COs
(Krommendijk 2014, 372). At the same time, the great majority of the
COs has, however, remained ineﬀective. Approximately 900 out of a total
of more than 1000 COs have not had any eﬀect whatsoever, because they
were either explicitly dismissed by the government or the government
simply pointed to existing initiatives coinciding with the COs and argued
that the COs were already complied with suﬃciently (Krommendijk
2015). While Wind argues that domestic politics sometimes have the
upper hand vis-à-vis ICs, these ﬁgures show that domestic politics often
trump in the case of UN human rights treaty bodies (Wind Introduction
this volume). Most of the measures taken as a result of the COs were
related to the COs of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, at least in
absolute terms: thirty-three of the seventy-four eﬀective COs.
The role of the Dutch Parliament has been more important in contribut-
ing to the eﬀectiveness of COs. What has happened more often in the
Netherlands is that the government (initially) dismissed the COs and that it
was only willing to proceed after pressure by domestic actors, such as
NGOs, courts or Parliament. By contrast, the eﬀectiveness of COs in New
Zealand and Finland has been more executive driven with a smaller invol-
vement of their Parliaments. The primary reason for the eﬀectiveness of
COs in New Zealand is the various CRCWork Programmes adopted by the
government in 2000 to 2008, which contained concrete targets or mile-
stones for policy or legislative action on the basis of COs of the CRC
Committee. This CRC Work Programme has been an important factor in
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the eﬀectiveness of almost half of all eﬀective COs in New Zealand
(Krommendijk 2014, 308–10). In Finland, the eﬀectiveness of COs has
also been more government driven. As already pointed out, there has
been more of a legalistic compliance culture among Finnish oﬃcials and
a greater tendency to accept external criticism than in the other two
countries (Husa 2010; Ojanen 2012, 98; Krommendijk 2014, 325, 355,
359–60). This also means that fewer COs have been rejected by the
Finnish government or remained completely unaddressed. There is an
idea among government oﬃcials that strong counterarguments are needed
when acting diﬀerently from the COs. By contrast, COs are seen more as
non-binding opinions byDutch andNew Zealand oﬃcials. This alsomeans
that the Finnish government has been more willing to act upon COs in the
absence of domesticmobilisation ofNGOs and Parliament. This can also be
attributed to the more positive stance of Finnish oﬃcials about the impor-
tance of reporting as a learning exercise and the quality of the treaty bodies.
In addition, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs has been important in
urging other ministries to act upon COs. As a result of the greater will-
ingness of the Finnish government (oﬃcials) to respond to COs, there has
been less contestation and mobilisation in Finland than in the Netherlands.
The Finnish government has been described as ‘a government civil society
and a civil society government’ (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002, 284).
10.3.2.1 Parliament as Driver for Eﬀectiveness
It has been shown elsewhere that the greater eﬀectiveness of the COs of the
CRC Committee can be attributed to the higher level of mobilisation of
domestic actors such as NGOs, the media and MPs (Krommendijk 2015).
Domestic actors have been considerably less active with respect to the other
UN human rights treaties. Each of the three Parliaments has been an
important actor facilitating the eﬀectiveness COs on some occasions. Some
COs have been eﬀective and resulted in change partly as a result of the eﬀorts
ofMPs.This sectionwill present several examples to illustrate the potential of
parliaments as drivers for the eﬀectiveness of COs. Three modalities of
a parliament’s contribution to the eﬀectiveness can be distinguished. First,
MPshave sometimes vettedbills on thebasis of theCOs. Second, parliaments
have pressured the government to take policy or legislative measures in line
with the COs. Third, parliamentary attention for the COs has led to studies
and evaluations or has put an issue (higher) up on the political agenda.
10.3.2.1.1 MPs Vetting a Bill One of the clearest examples of MPs
taking action themselves on the basis of the COs is the establishment of
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aChildren’sOmbudsman, whichwas recommended three times by theCRC
Committee (CRC 1999, para. 12). The Dutch government was unwilling to
establish a separate ombudsman institution primarily for ﬁnancial reasons.
It was as a result of a legislative proposal by the MP Khadija Arib (Labour)
that the ﬁrst Children’s Ombudsman eventually took oﬃce on 1 April 2011.
Arib made clear that her legislative proposal was based on the COs of the
CRC Committee (TK 2001/02c). What’s more, Arib also used the COs as
a supporting argument for her proposal. Several other MPs also mentioned
the COs as a reason for the establishment of the Children’s Ombudsman on
nineteen occasions, including in two motions. Interviewed government
oﬃcials and NGO representatives stressed the crucial role of the pressure
and political interest of Parliament for the COs to be eﬀective.
A contributory factor to the eﬀectiveness of the COs was the considerable
media attention to the COs as well as the lobby of NGOs (especially Defence
for Children International and UNICEF) that advised Arib on the matter.
Something similar happened in New Zealand with COs of the CRC
Committee urging the government to prohibit corporal punishment.
It was as a result of the COs of 3 October 2003 that MP Sue Bradford
(Green Party) announced her Private Members Bill three days later (CRC
2003, paras. 29–30). Bradford explicitly stated that she was ‘stirred into
political action by the recommendations that the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child made on two occasions’ (Wood et al. 2008, 204).
The COs and the CRC were useful and gave her and other advocates
a strong position to discuss the matter with government ministers. They
oﬀered an (international) endorsement and an additional level of legiti-
macy as justiﬁcations for change. As in the Dutch case, an important
factor contributing to the COs’ eﬀectiveness was the strong lobbying of
NGOs, with which Bradford had regular contact and which also advised
her on certain issues (Wood et al. 2008, 190).
10.3.2.1.2 MPs Pressuring the Government to Act COs have also
oﬀered useful tools for MPs to pressure the government to take action in
line with the COs. One notable example of this category is the pressure
exercised by the Dutch Parliament, especially by left-wing opposition
parties, on the government with respect to the treatment and detention
of refugee and asylum-seeking children, which was criticised several times
by the CRC Committee (CRC 1999, para. 28). The COs were initially
disregarded by the centre-right governments of Balkenende I–III
(2002–7) because legislation was already deemed to be in conformity
with international norms (TK 2003/04a, 8). These governments were
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reluctant to change the legislation on the basis and result of (non-
binding) COs. Nonetheless, a new policy was developed on the basis
of the principles of the CRC, and there was a big shift towards less
detention of minors both at the political level and in practice (TK
2005/06a; Smits-Baauw & Van Os 2007, 2). This policy change was
partly the result of the extensive pressure in Parliament, more speci-
ﬁcally by way of two motions requesting that government consider
alternatives for parents with children in detention (TK 2005/06b; TK
2006/07). In their political lobby, MPs used domestic and interna-
tional criticism from a plethora of bodies. The COs were one of the
many useful sources that kept the issue on the political agenda and
increased the pressure on the government. Three earlier motions,
which did not get a parliamentary majority, did, for example, refer
to the COs (TK 2003/04b). The strong parliamentary focus on this
issue and the use of COs by MPs can be attributed to the extensive
lobbying on the part of NGOs, which had organised themselves in the
Coalition ‘No child in a cell’ and used the COs as an important tool.
This Coalition, for example, presented 138,212 signatures in
June 2006 to several MPs, including those who subsequently pro-
posed the decisive motion. Another contributory factor for the con-
siderable parliamentary engagement with the COs is the signiﬁcant
coverage of the issue by the media, which used an eight-year-old
Chinese boy in detention as a ﬁgurehead.
10.3.2.1.3 MPs Attention Leading to Studies and Setting the Political
Agenda MPs have also used the COs to call for more attention to
a certain issue in the form of studies. One example of this category relates
to the COs of the CEDAWCommittee recommending the amendment of
the Law on Names, which provides that the child will automatically
receive the name of the father when the parents cannot reach an agree-
ment about the child’s name (CEDAW 2001, paras. 223–4). Again, the
Dutch government dismissed the COs and made clear that it did not
share the CEDAW Committee’s opinion that the Law on Names contra-
venes the CEDAW. One MP proposed an amendment to the Law on
Names but eventually withdrew it after the Dutch Council of State, which
advises on the quality of legislation, gave a negative opinion. Several MPs,
nonetheless, continued with pressuring the government to act and
referred to the COs on eight occasions during parliamentary debates or
in written parliamentary questions. Eventually, the repeated attention to
the COs by several MPs over a number of years resulted in theMinister of
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Justice Hirsch Ballin promising to establish a working group that would
also examine the Law on Names in the light of the COs.
Another Finnish example is the criticism from several UN human
rights treaty bodies as well as other international and European
(human rights) monitoring organisations about the land rights of the
indigenous Sami reindeer herders that are undermined by forestry and
mining activities. The COs were an important factor in the public and
political debate and were highlighted in parliamentary discussions.
The COs kept the issue almost constantly on the (political) agenda and
also increased the pressure to proceed with the matter. The COs and
other international criticism have led to numerous reports as well as
some unsuccessful legislative attempts to settle the question of Sami land
rights (Semb 2012; Krommendijk 2014, 347–8).
10.3.2.2 Parliaments as Obstacles for the Eﬀectiveness of COs
Parliaments do not only contribute to the eﬀectiveness of COs. They can
also pose an obstacle to the implementation of international human
rights and COs as well (Donald & Leach 2015, 87; Wind Introduction
this volume). First, a wide parliamentary consensus on a certain practice
can be used as a simple excuse (by the government) for not acting upon
COs (see Section 10.3.2.1). Second, MPs can be self-righteous and critical
about the legitimacy and quality of UN human rights treaty bodies and
the COs and consequently argue against the implementation of COs (this
section).
10.3.2.2.1 Wide Parliamentary Consensus as an Excuse to Do
Nothing The three governments have sometimes used the parliamen-
tary consensus as an excuse for not following the COs.5 They have
primarily pointed to the ex ante parliamentary endorsement in the
form of an extensive and careful discussion or the coalition agreement
among the ruling political parties as ‘ﬁg leafs’ for inaction. This has
especially happened in the Netherlands where international criticism of
the Dutch ‘liberal’ practices such as abortion, euthanasia and prostitution
have often remained ineﬀective. COs related to these issues have simply
not been taken note of by most domestic actors, because they have
generally been considered political non-issues given the political and
5 The parliamentary scrutiny and discussion about the proportionality of a limitation to
a human right could also be used when defending a case before the ECtHR or during the
dialogue with the treaty bodies to justify certain policy or legislative measures (Donald &
Leach 2015, 84).
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parliamentary consensus in favour of these policies (Krommendijk
2014, 133). One example relates to the COs of the Human Rights
Committee about the Dutch Medical Research (Human Subjects) Act,
which makes it possible to conduct medical experiments with minors
and other persons unable to give their consent (HRC 2001, para. 7).
In its response to the COs, the government argued that it was not
willing to change the law and underlined that the Dutch Parliament
had already discussed the arguments for medical experiments exten-
sively during the consideration of the bill. According to the govern-
ment, Parliament had carefully weighed all arguments and also paid due
regard to the compliance with treaty requirements (TK 2001/02, 6–7).
With respect to euthanasia, the government likewise underlined that
the concerns that were later expressed by the HRC in its COs had been
at the forefront during the preparation of the legislative proposal and
the parliamentary discussion. In addition, the government simply
pointed to the coalition agreement determining that no amendments
would be made in the period of oﬃce (TK 2009/10, 3). Another example
is the earlier discussed criticism on detention of asylum-seeking chil-
dren. In response to questions in Parliament about the COs, Minister
for Immigration and Integration (VVD) Rita Verdonk simply referred
to the coalition agreement that laid down the earlier agreed-upon
restrictive immigration policy (TK 2003/04c, 1812). She argued that
the immigration laws had been drafted together with the Parliament
and that if Parliament considered amendments necessary, it should be
up to Parliament to make this explicit (TK 2003/04d, 5851).
10.3.2.2.2 Self-righteous and Defensive Reactions MPs have not
always been in favour of acting upon the COs. Especially New
Zealand MPs have been self-righteous and critical about the legitimacy
and quality of UN human rights treaty bodies and the COs. Quite
a number of MPs referred to the criticism or recommendations of the
treaty bodies with disapproval. MP Darren Hughes (Labour) noted, for
example, that
people at the fringes of politics have become very excited about a report
from a United Nations committee regarding the Foreshore and Seabed
Act. But I think it is very important to put on the record that that overseas
committee considered that important matter for simply 35 minutes, and
that it was not a committee made up of countries that we could say have
a better race relations record than New Zealand does.
(NZPD 2005a)
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Tony Ryall (National) argued in similar fashion: ‘New Zealand has
made it quite clear to all the international agencies that we will not follow
their rules as we have our own rules’ (NZPD 2005b). Future Minister of
Justice Simon Power (National) was also critical about MPs who would
like to have the recommendations of the HRC implemented ‘lickety-split’
(NZPD 2003). Likewise Gerry Brownlee (National) stated that ‘New
Zealanders don’t need to be told by the UN what it means to be a Kiwi.
Fair-minded Kiwis will reject these statements outright, because they
know them to be untrue’ (Brownlee 2005).
Similar developments can be observed in the Netherlands (Krommendijk
2014, 80–2). Several political parties and MPs have become more critical
about international human rights treaties and monitoring in recent years.
International human rights treaties are increasingly viewed as obstructing
the implementation of intended policy initiatives, particularly in the ﬁeld of
immigration and integration. Then VVD (Liberals) Leader in the Second
Chamber and the current Prime Minister Mark Rutte even referred to
‘outdated European treaties’ that prevent putting an end to the big ﬂow of
migrants (Rutte 2010). Criticism is also growing among politicians, both in
Parliament and in government, as to international intervention in domestic
aﬀairs as well as domestic court judgments in relation to human rights
(Oomen 2013, 308).More recently, theVVDand the PVV (right-wing), and
to a lesser extent the CDA (centre-right Christian democratic), have been
critical about the expansionist power and interpretation of the ECtHR
(Donald & Leach 2015, 71; Gerards 2015). Even relatively human
rights–minded MPs such as Alexander Pechtold (D66/ centrist social-
liberal) and Diederik Samson (Labour) reacted defensively to criticism of
the European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in 2013 on
the measures in place to address racial discrimination. Pechtold stated, for
example: ‘Yeah, well, then there are these independents organs that make an
analysis once in a while . . . I think we should always be alert . . . but I do not
think that we in the Netherlands are really out of tune with other countries’
(Pownews 2013). Samson likewise held: ‘I understand what the Council of
Europe thinks about that [interviewer: Do you really understand?] Yes, well,
I understand that looking to the Netherlands from the outside . . . [why are
they intervening!] I use very decent words to say more or less the same’
(Pownews 2013).
Underlying such negative views of MPs in both New Zealand and the
Netherlands is the feeling that there are no (grave) human rights pro-
blems in both countries, that international human rights treaties are
already suﬃciently complied with and that international criticism is
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unjustiﬁed (Butler & Butler 2005, paras. 2, 3, 39, 35.9.2; Krommendijk
2014, 314–15). Several government oﬃcials share these views. UN
human rights treaties and the treaty bodies are primarily seen as relevant
for other countries. Oomen referred in this context to ‘human rights
exportism’ where treaties are considered as yardsticks for others (Oomen
2013). International human rights are often considered irrelevant in
domestic political debates and public discourse. When issues are framed
in terms of human rights, this can lead to surprised or even dismissive
responses, as the previously cited quotes illustrate as well. These senti-
ments explain – in addition to mere ignorance or limited knowledge
about COs –whymost COs have not hadmuch impact in parliament and
have remained ineﬀective. MPs have either actively argued against doing
something on the basis of COs, or they have not put pressure on the
government to act in line with COs.
10.4 Explanatory Factors for the Parliaments’
Engagement with COs
This section will further explore several explanatory factors or indepen-
dent variables that might account for the (diﬀerence) in the engagement
of parliaments with COs, that is, the impact of COs on parliament and
parliament’s role in the eﬀectiveness of COs (see Table 10.2 for an over-
view). The empirical results on only three established liberal democracies
do not give suﬃcient ground to formulate some generalisable and deﬁ-
nitive conclusions for contrasting States, such as recent democracies or
States with malfunctioning parliaments as well as countries that are
members of arguably weaker regional human rights systems, such as
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). It is against
this background that the following tentative observations are put for-
ward, which should be tested in future research:
1. The impact and eﬀectiveness of COs is larger in countries with
a proportional electoral system. One factor that has contributed to
the eﬀectiveness of COs is the proportional electoral system in the
three countries that have empowered small political parties. Such
smaller parties have an incentive to use COs, because this can give
them some authority and an additional lever in the debate or they can
be used as a political tool to portray their party as rights friendly
(Butler 2011; Geddis 2011, 471). COs have also been used somewhat
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more frequently by the relatively small Green Party in all three
countries, or in the case of New Zealand the Maori Party (Butler
2011; Krommendijk 2014, 287, 361). What is more, the proportional
electoral system also facilitates small parties initiating or prompting
action on the basis of COs. The latter was the case with the earlier
discussed bill prohibiting corporal punishment in New Zealand,
which was proposed by an MP from the small Green Party (Sue
Bradford).
2. The impact and eﬀectiveness of COs is larger in countries with
a bicameral parliamentary system. The empirical results for the
Netherlands imply that having a second chamber is beneﬁcial for
parliament’s engagement with COs. The Dutch Senate, which has
traditionally operated as a ‘chamber of reﬂection’, has paid consider-
able attention to (ex ante) conformity with international (human
rights) law and discussed this more extensively than the House of
Representatives (Claes & Leenknecht 2011, 292). There has also been
considerable attention to the COs in the Senate (EK 2008/09; EK
2009/10; EK 2010/11). A study found similar results in the UK,
where the House of Lords was found to engage more with human
rights reports of the Joint Committee of Human Right than the House
of Commons (Hunt, Hooper & Yowell 2012, 25). Explanations for the
less prominent role of the House of Representatives in relation to
human rights, which might also be applicable for other countries, are
the limited legal expertise to analyse jurisprudence of ICs and mon-
itoring bodies; the great(er) turnover and, hence, limited experience
of MPs; the absence of a collective or institutional memory; or the
limited popularity of being involved in – the rather technical exercise
of – legislation (Krommendijk 2014, 77). Even though Finland has
a unicameral system, the Constitutional Law Committee has taken
a largely similar role as the Dutch Senate. This Committee composed
of politicians has been characterised as a legal expert body free of party
politics that adopts a quasi-judicial approach and pays due regard to
international (human rights) law and the output of treaty bodies
(Niemi 2003, 31; ILA 2004, para. 160; Husa 2011, 198; Tuori 2012,
11–12).
3. The existence of a separate constitutional or human rights committee as
such does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the impact and eﬀectiveness of COs.
This observation also ﬂows from the preceding paragraph, which
discussed the similarities between the Dutch Senate and the
Constitutional Law Committee in terms of ensuring that human
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rights arguments are suﬃciently considered. The mainstreamed
approach in the Netherlands, where no particular (sub)committee
has a human rights mandate, but where human rights are considered
across the board by diﬀerent committees when they are relevant, has
not prevented COs from having an impact (Donald & Leach 2015,
71–2). No evidence suggests that the engagement of the Finnish
Parliament with COs has been higher than that of the Dutch
Parliament. There is, however, more of a diﬀerence between New
Zealand, on the one hand, and the Netherlands and Finland, on the
other hand. Because New Zealand has a unicameral system and/or no
specially designated human rights committee, human rights matters
and COs are not structurally embedded in the parliamentary system.
The latter is further aggravated by the following two phenomena
(points 4 and 5 following).
4. The formal legal status of international human rights treaties and the
possibilities for judicial review by courts also aﬀect the extent to which
parliament pays attention to these treaties and COs. One factor that
aﬀects the engagement of both national courts and parliaments with
international (human rights) law is the legal status of treaties in
a country’s legal order. This relationship is especially supported by
the empirical result for New Zealand, where UN human rights treaties
have not been legally incorporated.What’s more, courts are precluded
from declaring legislative enactments inconsistent with the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act and international human rights treaties.6
These treaties and treaty bodies have consequently had a much lower
legal and political status. Knowing that courts cannot overturn legis-
lation, the New Zealand Parliament has no incentive to examine the
consistency of bills with the domestic Bill of Rights let alone UN
treaties (Geddis 2011; Kelly 2011, 308–9). By contrast, when interna-
tional human rights treaties are automatically part of the legal order
(the Dutch monistic order) or legally incorporated (all UN treaties are
incorporated in the Finnish dualist system), this oﬀers more scope for
domestic actors, including MPs, to rely on them. The reason is that
courts have more possibilities to use international human rights
6 See Sec. 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights. This act includes civil and political rights that
mirror the ICCPR. Although the act has as its objective ‘to aﬃrm New Zealand’s commit-
ment to the ICCPR’, the ICCPR is not directly incorporated and can therefore not be given
eﬀect by courts. The act has therefore been characterised as a ‘parliamentary Bill of Rights’,
which is realised through political rights review in parliament instead of judicial review
(Kelly 2011, 304).
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treaties, which at the same time has encouraged other actors to closely
examine these treaties. The Finnish practice actually shows that the
empowerment of courts in 2000 to disapply national laws when in
conﬂict with the Constitution has positively aﬀected the parliamen-
tary ex ante scrutiny of bills and possibly also the impact of UN
treaties and COs (Lavapuro, Ojanen & Scheinin 2011, 524).7
5. Parliaments engage more with the COs in countries that are members of
a strong regional human rights system, such as the Council of Europe.
The impact and eﬀectiveness of COs have, maybe counter-intuitively,
also beneﬁtted from the existence of a strong regional human rights
system. This is well illustrated by Finland, where it was the late
ratiﬁcation of the ECHR in 1990 that was a ‘turning point’ and
subsequently led to a growing proﬁle and culture of human rights in
general (Rosas 2001, 310–11; Lavapuro, Ojanen & Scheinin 2011, 520;
Tuori 2012, 9). Before that, when Finland had only ratiﬁed UN human
rights treaties, human rights played an insigniﬁcant role in the legis-
lative process, in the government bureaucracy and in parliamentary
proceedings (Rosas 2001, 297). This early Finnish experience can be
compared with the current situation in New Zealand, where the
absence of a truly eﬀective external human rights check in-line with
the ECHR and ECtHR has facilitated Parliament’s lack of interest or
unwillingness to examine human rights matters. At the same time, the
CRC and CEDAW have had more impact than that of other UN
treaties in the Netherlands because they do not face ‘competition’ in
the form of equivalent provisions in regional treaties (see next point).
6. The level of parliament’s engagement with COs depends upon other
domestic actors informing and lobbying parliament to take due account
of the COs. The tentatively most important factor aﬀecting the engage-
ment of parliament with the COs is the mobilisation of civil society
actors, such as professional organisations of judges or lawyers or com-
ments of academics, but especially NGOs (Hillebrecht 2014, 22–4; Saul
2015; Squatrito 2015). The previous section showed that when parlia-
ments had contributed to the eﬀectiveness of COs, this was often
(partly) the result of and facilitated by the work of NGOs. MPs are
generally eager to make use of commentaries and information from
NGOs, because of the limited time they have at their disposal.
7 A constitutional amendment in 2000 empowered Finnish courts to not apply a statutory
provision when the provision ‘would be in evident conﬂict with the Constitution’
(Sec. 106).
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The lobbying of NGOs has often been a major reason for MPs to allude
to COs. One example fromNew Zealand is themedia release of MP Jan
Logie (Green Party) in which she highlighted the criticism of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights concerning wel-
fare reforms (Radio New Zealand 2012). The NGO Peace Movement
Aotearoa brought the criticism to her attention (Logie 2012). Likewise,
the Dutch Labour MPHans Spekman asked the government to react to
several COs of CESCR as a result of a conversation with a professor of
human rights. Spekman had never heard of CESCR and its COs even
though he dedicated himself especially to the rights of undocumented
migrants and children (Spekman 2011). Further support indicating the
dependency ofMPs onNGOs is the relatively high impact of the COs of
the CRC Committee and the CEDAW Committee in the Netherlands.
Table 10.3 shows that the COs of the CRC Committee have been
mentioned in more parliamentary papers by the parliament (in ﬁfty-
six parliamentary papers) than all the other ﬁve treaty bodies together
(in forty-one parliamentary papers). The COs CEDAW Committee
occupies second place. This is not surprising in the light of the strength
and professionalism of the Dutch Children’s Rights Coalition and the
Dutch CEDAW Network, which have both invested heavily in report-
ing under both treaties and monitoring as follow-up to COs. Both
NGOs have, for instance, sent parliament their comments on the
government’s response to the COs. They have also organised confer-
ences and seminars to discuss follow-up with MPs or sometimes even
with the responsibleminister. The comments of these NGOs have often
been explicitly mentioned by MPs during parliamentary debates (TK
2008/09, 4, 5). The focus of NGOs on reporting under the CRC and – to
a lesser extent – CEDAW can also be explained by the fact that these
treaties are the most important points of reference for children’s and
women’s rights. No regional equivalents for the CRC and CEDAW are
more comprehensive and oﬀer stronger remedies. By contrast, NGOs
and other domestic actors prefer Council of Europe mechanisms over
the closely related but weaker UN human rights treaties: the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (ECPT) instead of the Committee against
Torture, the ECtHR instead of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, EuropeanCommission against Racism and Intolerance
(ECRI) instead of CERD and the European Social Charter (ESC)
instead of CESCR.
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7. The level of parliament’s engagement with COs depends upon the
salience and media coverage of the policy issue covered in the COs.
Another related explanation for the parliamentary engagement with
COs is the salience of the issues that are dealt with in the CO.
The greater impact and eﬀectiveness of COs of the CRC Committee
in all three countries can, for example, be explained by the topical
interest in the issue of children’s rights (Simmons 2009, 357–8).
Children’s rights meet a clear response in the wider society and
parliament and hardly anyone is openly against children’s rights
because children are generally considered to be in a vulnerable posi-
tion. Children are more mediagenic and can be more easily used as
ﬁgureheads, such as the example of the Chinese asylum-seeking child
already noted. By contrast, other groups such as prisoners, criminals
and migrants generally proﬁt less from such a beneﬁcial status. There
is a close connection between the salience of an issue and the degree of
media attention. Parliamentary attention is primarily driven by news-
paper headlines. Several interviewees noted that when COs are not
reported in the media, it is often diﬃcult for MPs to use COs or to put
them on the agenda. The great inﬂuence of the media was also
attributed to the information overload and lack of time for MPs and
the pressure to attract media coverage. The importance of media
coverage for the attention in parliament is illustrated by the fact that
media attention for reporting under CRC and the COs of the CRC
Committee has been signiﬁcantly higher than any of the other ﬁve
treaty bodies (see Table 10.3). Thirty-seven of the ninety-seven arti-
cles referring to the reporting process under all six treaties related to
the CRC Committee (Krommendijk 2014, 256).
8. The level of parliament’s engagement with COs depends upon MPs’
direct engagement with the treaty bodies. The actual use made of COs
by MPs can also be inﬂuenced by their direct engagement with the
treaty bodies. A ﬁrst example is the Maori Party in New Zealand,
which was directly involved in reporting by way of submitting an
alternative report to CERD in May 2007 (Maori Party 2007). This
political party was actually founded in 2004 as a result of the
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, which conferred the ownership of
the foreshore and seabed to the State to safeguard public access to
beaches. The Maori were vocally opposed to this act and argued that
they were the rightful owners based on historical possession. NGOs
voiced their grievances with CERD, which concluded in 2005 that the
act contained ‘discriminatory aspects’ against Maori. The boomerang
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thrown by Maori NGOs to Geneva returned to New Zealand and was
used by Maori NGOs that had close contacts with Maori MPs, who
subsequently also used the COs during parliamentary debates to
strengthen their criticism vis-à-vis the government. The COs of
CERD were used on several occasions, almost always by MPs from
the Maori Party. Table 10.4 shows that CERD is the most often
referred to treaty body in the New Zealand Parliament. A second
example is the Finnish case. There were ‘a signiﬁcant number of cases’
around the 2000s during which the Constitutional Law Committee
relied on the output of the HRC, mostly the views of the HRC and not
so much the COs (ILA 2004). Some Finnish interviewees noted that
this reliance was the result of the academic Scheinin, who was
a member of the HRC from 1997 to 2004. The Constitutional Law
Committee regularly consulted him during this period. Some inter-
viewees noted that when Scheinin went abroad, the output of the HRC
was discussed less often. This has been alleviated in recent years as
a result of the dialogues with treaty bodies by individual MPs since
2005. The MP Elisabeth Nauclér from the Swedish People’s Party of
Finland who attended CEDAW 2008, stated that she would report
back to Parliament on the outcome of the dialogue and ‘would be
attentive to follow-up’ (CEDAW 2008, para. 66). Nauclér indeed
organised a discussion meeting about CEDAW and the reporting
process, and she mentioned CEDAW and the COs several times in
a number of speeches. She felt inspired by the dialogue and did not
deride the quality of the CEDAW Committee (Nauclér 2013). Future
research should examine whether this dialogue has had a considerable
eﬀect, given that only ﬁve Finnish MPs have been to Geneva since
2005, and whether such attendance has a positive eﬀect as well.
It could also be that MPs are actually discouraged from using the
COs after having seen the treaty bodies in action themselves, because
they are disappointed in the functioning and level of quality of the
treaty body and dialogue. The latter has especially happened with
Dutch and New Zealand government oﬃcials (see Section 10.3.2.2.2;
Krommendijk 2015).
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9. The level of parliament’s engagement with COs depends upon the extent
to which the government has informed parliament about the COs.
Another important factor that aﬀects the engagement of parliament
is the extent to which the government informs parliament about the
reporting process and the COs. Such informing has mostly been
developed in the Netherlands, where the Dutch government generally
sends most UN documents in the context of the reporting process
(State reports and List of Issues) to Parliament. What is more, the
Dutch government has also sent its response to the COs of some treaty
bodies to Parliament. There have even been debates in Parliament on
the basis of the government reaction (see Table 10.3). The Dutch
practice stands in sharp contrast with that of New Zealand, where
no information whatsoever is sent by the government to Parliament.
MP Keith Locke (Green Party) held that had NGOs not been involved
in the process or been to Geneva, no information would get through
to New Zealand (Locke 2012). Note that merely sending documents to
parliament is surely not enough, because MPs are confronted with
piles of paper and full email inboxes every day, so the importance of
this factor should not be underestimated (see also Donald & Leach
2015, 74).
10.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the way in which parliaments adapt to or utilise the
output of international human rights monitoring bodies, the COs.
It showed that parliament is a relevant actor to consider when it comes
Table 10.4 Number of occasions during which MPs
referred to various treaties, treaty bodies and COs in
New Zealand (2000–2012)
Treaty or committee COs
CAT 23 9
ICERD 24 13
ICESCR 6 0
CRC 72 6
CEDAW 7 5
ICCPR 50 2
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to the implementation of COs. Even though the treaty bodies are strictly
speaking not ICs, the empirical observations are relevant for the discussion
of ICs and domestic politics. Similar domestic variables aﬀect the engage-
ment of parliaments with judgments of (human rights) ICs. This chapter
showed that parliaments have at times used some COs as useful tools
domestically. What is more, parliaments can also contribute (in)directly to
the eﬀectiveness of COs. MPs can do so in diﬀerent ways, by vetting a bill
on the basis of the COs themselves or by pressuring the government to act
upon the COs. The level of parliament’s engagement with COs depends
very much upon other domestic actors informing and lobbying parlia-
ments to take action on the basis of COs. Parliaments have, however, not
always favoured the implementation of COs and have sometimes even
posed an obstacle to their realisation, especially in the Netherlands and
New Zealand.
This chapter has formulated some tentative conclusions as to the
domestic variables that condition the impact and eﬀectiveness of COs,
which relate, among others, to the electoral system, the number of
chambers and the existence of a separate human rights committee. It is
to be hoped that future research will examine the role of parliaments in
relation to international (human rights) courts and tribunals in a more
systematic and in-depth way, possibly based on some of the tentative
conclusions reached here. Parliaments not only matter when it comes to
the implementation of international human rights from an empirical
point of view but also from a more political-normative one.
The (greater) engagement of parliament, as the primary locus of demo-
cratic decision making and legitimation, is desirable (Tushnet 1999;
Hunt, Hooper & Yowell 2012).
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